Sunday, January 01, 2006

This is why electronic voting machines are dangerous for democracy

Please read this article...

...Even if the card, which was tested on Monday, was legitimate, the ability to swap the card out for a corrupted card by Tuesday morning means any prior testing was a wasted effort. In that instance, the code tested before Election Day is not the code which runs on Election Day. In a similar way, interpreted code makes it difficult to determine on Wednesday what code actually was executed on Tuesday; even if the altered memory card is available. A detailed examination of the stream of AccuBasic tokens would be needed and even then you could not be certain exactly what was executed previously.

Where do we go from here? First, all voting machinery using such prohibited interpreted code must be recalled. Then it must be determined if Diebold is the only vendor with this design defect. Since the NASED/EAC system of independent test authority labs failed to note this defect in the Diebold equipment, it is likely a similar defect would go "unreported" if present in machinery from other vendors. And finally, the testing and certification process that allowed this unacceptable violation of security standards to be overlooked must be dramatically improved to protect the integrity of our election process.

(related posts)
Counting on Diebold
Diebold Hack Hints at Wider Flaws
NYT: The Business of Voting
Video: Voting Machines Hacked?
Elections Official: Some Voting Machines Could Be Hacked
The Dirty Little Secrets of Voting System Testing Labs
Powerful Government Accountability Office report confirms key 2004 stolen election findings
Diebold: Vote Hacking made easy 101
Electronic Voting Machines Steal Elections?


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